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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Introduction. 
This is the Reply Brief of the Idaho Transportation Department (the Department). 
The Department seeks review of the District Court's decision setting aside an 
Administrative Driver's License Suspension (ALS) entered by The Department's Hearing 
Examiner. 
b. Characterization of the Issues. 
Mr. Broadfoot accepts the characterization of the issue on appeal and does not 
offer any additional issues for the Court's consideration. The issue for the Court is 
whether there is substantial evidence in the Record as a whole supporting the Hearing 
Examiner's decision to suspend Mr. Broadfoot's driving privileges. 
II. Argument. 
The characterization of the issue on appeal reqUIres the revIewmg court to 
consider the Department's Hearing Examiner's Decision to suspend Mr. Broadfoot's 
driving privileges as a result of the failure of an evidentiary test for breath alcohol 
pursuant to I.C. § lS-S002A. 
The question here is not whether the District Court's reVIew of the Hearing 
Examiner's decision is supported by evidence in the Record as Broadfoot suggests but is 
instead whether the Hearing Examiner's decision is supported by substantial evidence in 
the Record. I 
The District Court's review should not weigh the evidence differently than that of 
the Hearing Examiner, instead the Court should determine whether there is sufficient 
1 The Court reviews the agency record independently of the District Court decision, Howard v. Canyon 
County Bd. ofCom'rs, 128 Idaho 479,915 F.2d 709 (1996). 
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evidence in the Department's Record supporting the conclusion of the Hearing 
Examiner.2 
The question is not whether the Court would agree with the findings made by the 
Hearing Examiner were the Court the finder of fact, but whether there is a reasonable 
basis for those findings, Masterson v. Idaho Dept. Transp., 150 Idaho 126, 244 P.3d 625, 
627 (Ct. App 2010). 
The Hearing Examiner here makes specific reference to the evidence in the 
Record on which he relied. The Hearing Examiner attaches significance to the fact that 
Mr. Broadfoot's breath alcohol results correlate within .02. Mr. Broadfoot's breath 
alcohol results were .l66 and .149, a correlation of .017. The agreement of the breath 
samples strongly refutes the possibility of mouth alcohol affecting the samples.3 
The Idaho State Police Forensic Services Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard 
Operating Procedure (IBASOP) specifically addresses the correlation of the breath 
alcohol test results. "The results of duplicate breath samples should correlate within .02 
to indicate the absence of alcohol contamination in the individual's breath pathway" 
(IBASOP 6.2.2.2 pp. 15-22). 
2 The Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence, 
Marshall v. Idaho Transp. Dept. J 37 Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d at 669 (Ct. App. 2002). 
3 The Hearing Examiner makes specific factual findings based on the Record, 
4. ISP Forensic Services SOP § 6.2 provides a complete breath alcohol test include two valid breath 
samples taken during the testing sequence and proceeded by air blanks. 
5. Exhibit 2 notes Broadfoot two subject breath test were within ISP Forensic Services SOP § 6.2 
requirements. 
6. ISP Forensic Services SOP § 6.2.2.2 notes the results for a duplicate breath sample should correlate 
within 0.02 to indicate the absence of alcohol contamination in the subject/individual's breath 
pathway .... 
7. The Intoxilyzer 5000 EN manual in Section I page 22 provides the 0.02 agreement of two breath 
samples taken during the testing sequence ... strongly refute the possibility of ... mouth alcohol ... 
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order, R. p. 059. 
See breath test results R. p. 029. 
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The Hearing Examiner also indicates the evidence from the video recording that 
he considered sufficient to support his decision. 
The video tape of the monitoring period shows Officer Dahlinger in close 
physical proximity to Mr. Broadfoot, conversing with Mr. Broadfoot and at no time 
turning his back to Mr. Broadfoot.4 
The Hearing Examiner's conclusion that Officer Dahlinger had ample opportunity 
to use a combination of his senses to determine that an event which could affect the 
breath alcohol content did not occur is supported by the Record. 
Further, the video recording demonstrates that a belch did not occur. The Hearing 
Examiner specifically finds that the since there was no movement in Mr. Broadfoot's 
throat mouth or cheeks, it is unlikely that a belch occurred. 5 
4 
9. Exhibit A provides during the monitoring period Officer Dahlinger was in close proximity to 
Broadfoot, conversed with Broadfoot. and when programming the Intoxilyzer 5000 EN (based 
upon the location of the Intoxilyzer 5000 EN and Broadfoot), Officer Dahlinger's side and not his 
back was towards Broadfoot. 
10. Exhibit A demonstrates Officer Dahlinger had ample opportunity to use all of senses to monitor 
Broadfoot within ISP Forensic Services SOP § 6.1 requirements. 
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order, R. p. 059. 
10. Ten seconds prior to Broadfoot's first breath sample. Exhibit A does not show any movement in 
Broadfoot's throat, mouth or cheeks to indicate any belching had occurred. 
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order, R. p. 059. 
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Mr. Broadfoot instead argues that the evidence should not be weighted 
considering those factors and conditions identified by the Hearing Examiner but to other 
factors like "machine noise.,,6 
The Hearing Examiner's findings indicate what information the Hearing 
Examiner considered, what weight was placed on that evidence by the Hearing Examiner 
and how the Hearing Examiner deliberated to the conclusions made by him. The Hearing 
Examiner clearly made factual determinations supported by the Record and which are 
binding on the reviewing Court. Urrutia v. Blaine County 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 
738, 742 (2000), "Marshall v. Department of Transp. 137 Idaho 337, 48 P.3d 666 (Ct. 
App.2002). 
It is the Court's emphasis on other facts in the Record coming to a contrary 
conclusion than the Hearing Examiner that is inconsistent with the Court's limited review 
of the facts. By placing different weight on the facts considered by the Hearing 
Examiner, the District Court substitutes its judgment for the judgment of the Hearing 
Examiner, Marshall at 340. 
6 See for example Mr. Broadfoot's arguments at p.17 of the Respondent's Brief: 
Further, the District Court did not improperly re-weigh the Moody's credibility 
detenninations regarding evidence. Rather, in reviewing the record as a whole, the 
District Court properly considered all of the evidence presented, including pieces of 
evidence that were ignored by Moody. Specifically, Moody's Findings make no mention 
of the circumstances surrounding the monitoring period as evidenced by the video except 
to state that Dahlinger's back was towards Broadfoot. R. at 57. He completely ignored 
numerous other pieces of evidence specifically mentioned by the District Court, including 
the length of time Dahlinger was turned away from Broadfoot, Dahlinger's activities 
while he was turned away from Broadfoot, and the loud beeping and humming noises in 
the room. R. at 200. The reviewing court is not bound by the agency's factual 
detenninations if they are not supported by substantial and competent evidence in the 
record. See Wilkinson v. State. 264 P.3d at 682. 
The District Court reviewed the same evidence that was available to Moody, much of 
which was ignored in Moody's Findings. 
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Here, Officer Dahlinger was able to use more than one of his senses to determine 
whether an event which may have introduced mouth alcohol to the breath testing sample 
occurred. Officer Dahlinger was in close physical proximity, never leaving the side of 
Mr. Broadfoot, distinguishing the facts here from the facts of Bennett v. State, Dept. of 
Transp., 147 Idaho 141,206 P.3d 505 (Ct. App. 2009). 
The Court of Appeals recently considered the circumstances of the Hearing 
Examiner's argument of the monitoring period, explaining further the Court's decision in 
Bennett. Peck v. State of Idaho, Dept. of Tramp., 2012 Opinion No. 25 Idaho Court of 
Appeals, April 30, 2012. There the Court considered the circumstances of the monitoring 
period based on the Officer maintaining a close physical proximity to the driver and the 
Hearing Examiner's determination of whether a belch occurred. The facts here are 
indistinguishable from those in Peck. 
The evidence is clear that while programming the Intoxilyzer 5000 EN, Officer 
Dahlinger maintained a sufficient physical proximity to Mr. Broadfoot so that his senses 
could be employed for purposes of determining whether a mouth alcohol event occurred. 
He was engaged with and conversed with Mr. Dahlinger for the entirety of the 
monitoring period even though he might have been programming the Intoxilyzer 5000 
EN. 
The Intoxilyzer testing room is enclosed. Officer Dahlinger is not distracted from 
the singular task of preparing for breath testing. The monitoring of Mr. Broadfoot and 
the programming of the Intoxilyzer 5000 EN are all part of that process. 
Most importantly there is no visible evidence of a belch. 
The purpose of the monitoring is to eliminate the risk of mouth alcohol affecting 
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the breath testing results. If there is no evidence of an event introducing mouth alcohol 
and the breath test samples correlate within .02, there is no factual basis to believe that 
the monitoring was insufficient. 
In asking the Court to consider the scientific reliability of the Intoxilyzer, Mr. 
Broadfoot introduces an issue which was not before the Hearing Examiner and is 
specifically not supported by the Administrative Record. The Idaho Court has recently 
rejected this argument in the Administrative License Suspension setting, Bell v. Idaho 
Transp. Dept., 151 Idaho 659, 262 P.3d 1030 (2011). 
Mr. Broadfoot suggests that a qualitative analysis of Officer Dahlinger's 
monitoring of Mr. Broadfoot is appropriate. However, the Court does not engage in a 
piecemeal qualitative analysis. Instead the Court looks at the Record as a whole, not an 
analysis of the various components of the monitoring to determine the sufficiency of the 
whole. 
It is inappropriate to use a qualitative analysis, for example a separation analysis 
to determine the nature of specific materials, when the legal standard is to consider the 
Record as a whole. When Mr. Broadfoot suggests that if other facts were weighed 
properly there would be a different result, Mr. Broadfoot is simply arguing that the Court 
should substitute it's judgment for that of the Hearing Examiner. 
Instead the Court's factual review requires a consideration of whether a 
reasonable person would find such facts sufficient to support the decision made, 
A1asterson, at 627. 
Neither, is this case factually similar to State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 988 P.2d 
225 (Ct. App. 1999) nor is State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335, 144 P.3d 40 (Ct. App. 
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2006) applicable here. 
The review of the circumstances of breath alcohol testing are case and fact 
specific. Generalizations about decisions which do not discuss the driver's burden are not 
applicable here. However, the sufficiency of Officer Dahlinger's monitoring of Mr. 
Broadfoot would be found acceptable considering DeFranco. Clearly, the monitoring by 
Officer Dahlinger in a closed room, in close physical proximity to Mr. Broadfoot, 
recorded for the Court's review more than meets the required standard. 
Interestingly absent from Mr. Broadfoot's analysis is the fact that the entirety of 
the monitoring period is recorded and able to be viewed by the Court. The Court does 
not have to rely upon the testimony of Officer Dahlinger or a second officer, (Wilkinson 
v. State, Dept. of Transp., 151 Idaho 784, 264 P.3d 680 (2011)) to determine the 
circumstances of the monitoring. Clearly there is no evidence of an event which would 
introduce mouth alcohol into Mr. Broadfoot's breath sample. 
Mr. Broadfoot's arguments nonwithstanding the District Court did not engage in 
the statutory construction of a new version of the IBASOPs. Neither are the revisions of 
the IBASOP substantially different than the previous versions. Statutory construction is 
not necessary in order to determine that the Hearing Examiner's conclusions are based 
upon substantial evidence in the Record. 7 
There is no change in the fifteen minute requirement nor is there a change in the 
requirement that Officer Dahlinger use his senses to determine whether an event occurred 
which could have introduced mouth alcohol. 
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a 
conclusion. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance, Masterson v. Idaho 
Dept. of Transp. 150 Idaho 126, 244 P.3d 625 (Ct. App. 2010), citing Kinney v. Tupperware Co., 117 Idaho 
765, 769, 792 P.2d 330, 334 (1990). 
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The District Court is not determining what specific language in the Standard 
Operating Procedures mean, instead the District Court is determining what specific facts 
mean. The District Court simply weighs those facts differently than weighed by the 
Hearing Examiner. The entirety of the rubric of Mr. Broadfoot's argument is premised 
on the Hearing Examiner having ignored evidence that the District Court did not ignore. 
Mr. Broadfoot fails to show why the Hearing Examiner weighing of the evidence was 
unreasonable. All that is offered is that should the Court consider different facts and 
upon placing weight on those other facts, a different conclusion than the Hearing 
Examiner is available. 
Mr. Broadfoot also makes a umque analysis suggesting that when the Court 
considers the 'new' Standard Operating Procedures and the case law that existed before 
the new Standard Operating Procedures that there is a 'higher' standard of monitoring. 
The District Court here makes findings which are simply alternative findings 
looking at the same evidence as considered by the Hearing Examiner. That is not the 
Court's role. The Court's role is to determine whether it was reasonable to consider those 
facts and whether those facts support the conclusion of the Hearing Examiner, lvfasterson 
at 627. The Court's role is not to weigh those facts differently than the Hearing 
Examiner. 
Clearly, the Administrative Record of the Department supports the conclusion of 
the Hearing Examiner that a sufficient monitoring period occurred. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Broadfoot failed to meet his burden pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A(7) to show 
that the breath alcohol testing was not performed in conformity with I.C. § 18-8004(4) 
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and the Standard Operating Procedures of the Idaho State Police. 
The Hearing Examiner's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the 
Record as a whole. 
The Hearing Examiner's decision should be affirmed and Mr. Broadfoot's driving 
privileges should be suspended for ninety days. 
DATED this day of May, 2012. 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
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